Category: Publications & Conferences

France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF. This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices

Summary

1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
2. Products covered by the French rules
3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

Find more : https://www.legalmondo.com/2026/09/unfair-trading-practices-agrifood-france/

Albane Watine coordinated, alongside Lena Hoss (Elvinger Hoss Prussen) and Marc Krestin (Fieldfisher), the workshop “Untangling the Orchestra: Procedural and Substantive Battles in a Cross-Border Supply Chain Dispute.” The session was co-led by Chiara Caliandro (De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani), David Diris (Kocks & Partners Law Firm), Sara Khalil (Schoenherr Attorneys at Law), Diego Lange Ruiz (Veirano Advogados), Emil Szabó (Szecskay Attorneys at Law) and Bob Wanders (Houthoff).

A great achievement for the whole team: the workshop was awarded the prize for the congress’s most creative and interactive session.

The week was also marked by more personal moments, true to the AIJA spirit: the early-morning AIJA Run for Human Rights, the Home Hospitality Dinner on Wednesday evening, and two SCILL coaching sessions — one devoted to artificial intelligence, the other to leadership — a balance between professional, social, and personal development activities that is the hallmark of AIJA events.

On this occasion, our partner Christophe Héry led a workshop on best practices for preparing and negotiating export contracts.

Because an international contract is not limited to its legal dimension, the workshop served as a reminder that it is above all a genuine strategic tool for securing business relationships, anticipating export-specific risks, and providing lasting support for companies’ international development.

BCI, an organization backed notably by the Brittany Regional Council and the Brittany Chamber of Commerce and Industry, now supports more than 1,000 Brittany-based companies in their international development projects.

Many thanks to the BCI teams for their invitation, their trust, and the quality of the organization, in particular to Hemeryc Guillou, Jacques Renault, and everyone involved in making this event a success.

A report ordered in interim proceedings (référé) or on ex parte application (sur requête) on the basis of Article 145 of the French Code of Civil Procedure makes it possible to «preserve or establish, prior to any legal proceedings, evidence of facts on which the resolution of a dispute might depend.» It enables a bailiff (huissier / commissaire de justice) to record the breach of distribution or franchise agreements, evidence of unfair competition or free-riding (parasitisme), the condition of an asset or stock prior to termination of a contract, or to secure digital data before it disappears. A thorough understanding of the conditions for obtaining such an order and of its limits — particularly in international disputes — is directly decisive for the effectiveness of an evidence-gathering strategy.

Key points to remember

• An application for a court-ordered report, whether by interim proceedings or ex parte application, must be submitted to the presiding judge of the court that would have jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute, or of the court in whose jurisdiction the measures are to be carried out — bearing in mind that a jurisdiction clause cannot be invoked against the applicant.
• A bailiff’s report sought under Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires neither urgency nor the absence of any serious dispute: it is a standalone measure, distinct from general interim (référé) proceedings.
• The application must be drafted so as to satisfy all of the substantive conditions set by French law, and must be prepared well in advance to allow the bailiff to carry out the report effectively and beyond challenge.
• A bailiff’s report carried out pursuant to an ex parte order is the most effective method, but the non-adversarial nature of the application for authorization must be justified.
• In international matters, the French court may order a report at the request of a French or foreign party, provided the report is to be carried out in France (with different conditions applying depending on whether the Brussels I bis Regulation applies).

Why and how to obtain judicial authorization for a bailiff’s report ?

A bailiff’s report is particularly useful where there is a suspicion of unfair competition, free-riding, or breach of a contractual or post-contractual obligation. The report is drawn up by a commissaire de justice (bailiff), but without judicial authorization the bailiff cannot enter premises operated by third parties or compel them to provide information.

Among the various pre-trial investigative measures (mesures d’instruction in futurum) that a court may order under Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure (expert appraisal, investigation, witness examination, production of documents, etc.), the bailiff’s report makes it possible to describe and fix facts or documents at a given moment in time, at the premises of a contracting party or a competitor.

An application for a report submitted to the court must satisfy four cumulative conditions:

• A potential dispute, but no proceedings yet pending on the merits: the court (or arbitrator) must not already be seized of proceedings on the merits. A credible future dispute must be supported by specific evidence, without it being necessary to establish that the claim is well-founded.
• The existence of a legitimate reason (motif légitime) to establish evidence of facts on which the resolution of a dispute might depend. The legitimate reason is built around the existence of a foreseeable future dispute, and the concrete usefulness and necessity of the measure to protect the applicant’s rights. Business secrecy thus constitutes only a relative obstacle, which yields to a sufficiently established legitimate reason (Cass. 2e civ., 24 March 2022, No. 20-21.925), as, potentially, do medical confidentiality and the right to respect for one’s home or private life.
• The establishment or preservation of evidence: the measure sought must be aimed at gathering evidence, or preserving evidence at risk of being lost.
• And the proportionality of the reporting measure to the objectives pursued (Cass. 2e civ., 25 March 2021, No. 20-14.309; Cass. com., 28 June 2023, No. 22-11.752). The measure must therefore be precisely limited in time and in scope, so as to avoid any general investigative measure.

Where a large number of documents are being sought (invoices, emails, minutes, etc.), it is advisable to limit the measure using keywords specific to the dispute at hand. Similarly, where a report is to be carried out at a competitor’s premises, the order authorizing the report may direct the bailiff to keep some or all of the seized documents under seal pending a court decision (in interim proceedings) resolving any disputes relating to the protection of business secrets.

Judicial authorization may be sought either by way of an interim summons (assignation en référé), which involves a prior adversarial hearing, or by way of an ex parte application (requête), a unilateral, non-adversarial procedure. An ex parte order is the most effective route because of its element of surprise, but it requires that it be expressly justified — in the application (by the party) and then in the order (by the presiding judge) — that a prior adversarial hearing would compromise the effectiveness of the measure. This ground must be real and specific, and typically arises where there is a risk that the elements to be recorded could be altered or destroyed, or where the opposing party is likely to tamper with the evidence (Cass. 2e civ., 17 March 2016, No. 15-12.955).

The Article 145 interim procedure is autonomous in relation to the conditions applicable to general interim proceedings: neither urgency nor the absence of any serious dispute is required (Cass. ch. mixte, 7 May 1982).

Which court has territorial jurisdiction to authorize the report?

Since Decree No. 2025-619 of 8 July 2025 (known as the “Magicobus 2” decree), Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the applicant a choice of jurisdiction: the applicant may apply to

• either the presiding judge of the court that would have jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute,
• or the presiding judge of the court in whose jurisdiction the measure is to be carried out.

Where the investigative measure concerns real property, only the court of the place where the property is located has jurisdiction.

Case law now holds, as a matter of principle, that a jurisdiction clause cannot be invoked against a party applying to the judge presiding over interim or ex parte proceedings, who has jurisdiction under the rules referred to above (Cass. com., 13 September 2017, No. 16-12.196). Likewise, prior conciliation clauses (Civ. 3e, 28 March 2007, No. 06-13.209) — and probably prior mediation clauses as well — do not apply before an “Article 145 procedure” is initiated.

Does the French court have jurisdiction to authorize a report despite a foreign court’s jurisdiction over the merits?

Provided the report is to be carried out in France, it is possible to apply to the French court even though the dispute on the merits could be brought before a foreign court. However, depending on whether the defendant is established within the EEA — in which case jurisdiction is governed by the Brussels I bis Regulation or the Lugano Convention — or outside the EEA — in which case the jurisdiction of the French courts is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure — the applicable rules differ.

More specifically, in the case of parties established within the EU, Article 35 of the Brussels I bis Regulation provides that provisional or protective measures available under the law of a Member State may be applied for before the courts of that State, even where the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction over the merits. However, the CJEU has adopted a strict reading of this article, limiting this possibility to measures “intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere…” (ECJ, Reichert, 26 March 1992, C-261/90).

Measures that merely seek to assess the merits of a potential claim, determine its basis, or evaluate the arguments that could be raised do not fall within the concept of provisional or protective measures under Article 35 that can be sought from a court lacking jurisdiction over the merits (ECJ, St Paul Dairy, 28 April 2005, C-104/03). The Cour de cassation has aligned itself with this approach since 2021, and requires the court to determine whether the measure specifically seeks to protect the applicant against a risk that evidence may be lost (Cass. 1re civ., 27 January 2021, No. 19-16.917).

Compared with similar measures available under other European systems, the Article 145 report has the advantage of being very broadly applicable, both in terms of the scope of the tasks that may be ordered and the conditions for obtaining it. This is why, in such cases, it is worth being able to justify the jurisdiction of the French court seized under Article 145 by reference to its prospective jurisdiction over the merits (for example, through a jurisdiction clause).

Where a party is established outside the EU (or outside the Lugano Convention), the international jurisdiction of the French court to authorize a report in France is governed by ordinary French rules on conflicts of jurisdiction. Extending Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the international sphere, the French court will have jurisdiction whenever the report is to be carried out in France. Moreover, the Cour de cassation has held that Article 145 measures are governed by French procedural law, and that the court is not required to assess the “legitimate reason” by reference to the foreign law applicable to the merits (Cass. 1re civ., 3 November 2016, No. 15-20.495).

To remedy this, the Regulation prohibits providers from imposing any unjustified obstacle on their customers’ switching (whether changing provider or bringing the service in-house), whether pre-commercial, commercial, technical, contractual or organizational, and imposes minimum requirements on them designed to facilitate data reversibility.

Key points to remember

• The Data Act does not grant customers of a data processing service a right of early termination or a right of exit;
• However, it prohibits any unjustified obstacle to switching;
• Providers of data processing services must now include in their contracts a reversibility clause that complies with the Data Act’s minimum requirements;
• The notice period initiating the transition period may not exceed two months;
• The migration period may not exceed 30 calendar days, extendable up to 7 months in the event of duly justified technical impossibility;
• From 12 January 2027, switching fees will be completely abolished. Until that date, only fees corresponding to actual direct costs may be charged.

Which contracts are covered by the Data Act?

Chapter VI of the Data Act has its own specific scope. It applies to contracts concluded by providers of data processing services within the meaning of the Regulation — that is, digital services enabling ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources, covering SaaS (Software as a Service), IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) and PaaS (Platform as a Service) models.

As regards the data concerned, the Regulation applies to both personal data and non-personal data (Art. 1.2).

Two categories of services are expressly excluded from certain obligations arising from this chapter (Art. 31): (i) data processing services that are custom-built and not offered at large commercial scale, and (ii) services provided in test or beta version, for a limited period and for evaluation purposes.

As regards the temporal scope of application:

• The switching obligations (Chapter VI) have applied since 12 September 2025, to both ongoing contracts and those concluded from that date onward (Art. 50);
• The prohibition on unfair terms set out in Article 13 of the Data Act will only apply to ongoing contracts from 12 September 2027 (Art. 50);
• Switching fees will be completely abolished from 12 January 2027 (Art. 29).

What is the Data Act’s impact on contract duration?

The Regulation might suggest that it grants the customer a right of early termination as soon as it wishes to change provider, bring the service in-house, or delete its data. Three provisions in particular could be misleading:

• Article 25(2)(a) provides that the reversibility phase begins “on request” by the customer;
• Article 25(2)(c) requires the contract to state that it will be “deemed terminated” upon completion of the switching process;
• Article 29 requires the provider to inform the customer of any penalties applicable in the event of early termination.

But Recital 9 of the Regulation is unambiguous in this respect: the Data Act does not affect (national) contract law. The Regulation contains no express provision creating an autonomous ground for termination in the customer’s favor. It is therefore always the contract, and the contract alone, that determines when and under what conditions the parties may end their relationship.
The Data Act facilitates switching once the contract has come to an end, whatever the reason for that termination.

On the other hand, the Data Act may have an indirect effect on the actual duration of the contractual commitment, insofar as the contract continues throughout the transitional period, during which the provider is required to continue providing the services (Art. 25(2)(a)). This 30-day period may be significantly extended.

How does the Data Act ensure the effectiveness of data reversibility?

A data reversibility process organized into four successive phases:

–   Notification: the process begins with the customer notifying its intention to change provider or move to on-premises infrastructure (Art. 25.3). This notification marks the starting point of the notice period;

–   Notice period (≤ 2 months): from the notification, the provider must ensure continuity of service. This period may not exceed two months (Art. 25.2.d), and any contractual clause providing for a longer notice period is deemed not written;

–   Transitional period (≤ 30 days, or ≤ 7 months): once the notice period expires, the transitional migration period begins. This period may not exceed 30 calendar days (Art. 25.2.a), unless duly justified technical impossibility allows for an extension of up to 7 months (Art. 25.4). The customer may also request a single extension (Art. 25(5));

–   End of contract: the contract ends upon completion of the provider-switching process. The provider must maintain access to exportable data for a minimum period of 30 calendar days, and must then completely erase all data.

A mandatory, regulated reversibility clause

The Data Act now requires the provider to include in the contract a reversibility clause meeting a minimum content defined by the Regulation. This clause must in particular specify:

–   the scope of exportable data and the format in which data will be returned;

–   the notice period, which may not exceed 2 months;

–   the duration of the transition period (30 calendar days by default);

–   the provider’s obligation to assist with the customer’s exit strategy;

–   the applicable migration fees (until 12 January 2027, only actual direct costs incurred may be recharged, subject to prior notice – Art. 29);

–   the provider’s obligation to completely erase the exportable data and digital assets at the end of the recovery period.

Any reversibility clause included in a contract covered by the Data Act must also withstand review under the rules on unfair contract terms (Art. 13). Early termination penalties would remain lawful, provided they are proportionate and do not amount to a financial lock-in equivalent to forced continuation of the contract.

What are the penalties for failure to comply with these rules?

Member States are responsible for providing for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties in the event of non-compliance with these obligations (Art. 40). In France, ARCEP has been designated as the competent authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Regulation, in coordination with the CNIL for matters relating to personal data. Financial penalties could reach 3% of worldwide turnover (excluding tax) for the last closed financial year, rising to 5% in the event of repeat infringement. For legal entities that do not have a turnover figure allowing this ceiling to be determined, the penalty could be capped at €150,000, rising to €375,000 in the event of a further violation within five years.

In any event, the competent authority must, when setting the amount of the penalty, take into account the various criteria listed in Article 40(3) (in particular, the duration of the infringement, measures taken to mitigate or remedy the harm suffered, and the financial benefits obtained or losses avoided as a result of the infringement).

Authors :

• Christophe Héry, avocat associé
•  Maélie Trigo, élève avocate

This international event brought together German-speaking practitioners around key themes at the crossroads of leadership, performance and well-being in demanding professional environments.

Topics addressed included:

• leadership models and expectations within law firms
• managing uncertainty, motivation and emotional engagement
• self-management and sustainable performance

A dense and highly practical program, which provided concrete tools and perspectives directly applicable to the management of legal teams and the strategic development of professional practices.

Key points to remember

ANALYSIS

• A challenge based on the imprecision or imbalance of an asymmetric jurisdiction clause (AJC) must be assessed solely by reference to the autonomous criteria of Article 25(1) of Brussels I bis;
• The fact that an AJC is unbalanced does not, in itself, call its validity into question;

SCOPE

• An AJC providing for an option in favor of a court precisely named in an EEA country (e.g. “Brussels” or “the seller’s place of business”) is valid;
• An AJC providing for an option in favor of a court not precisely named (e.g. “any other court”) in an EEA country is valid, subject to certain conditions;
• An AJC providing for an option in favor of a court precisely named in a non-EEA country is, in principle, valid;
• An AJC providing for an option in favor of a court not precisely named (e.g. “any other court”) and stipulated in a contract objectively located outside the EEA could run the risk of being invalidated by a court in an EEA state;

ADVICE

• It is pointless, indeed risky, to mention a jurisdiction option without clearly writing the name of that court or an objective criterion for identifying it.

Origins: conflicting case law on the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses

The case that gave rise to the CJEU’s ruling concerned proceedings brought before the French courts by a project owner against a French supplier and its own Italian supplier, in a dispute relating to defects affecting a construction site. The supply contract for the works contained the following jurisdiction clause:

“The jurisdiction of the Brescia court shall apply to any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract. Società Italiana Lastre reserves the right to bring proceedings against the buyer before any other competent court in Italy or abroad.”

The defendant company raised an objection of lack of international jurisdiction, which was dismissed by the Rennes Court of Appeal. That court held that the clause, by reserving a choice of court to only one party, failed to meet the requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty arising from the Brussels I bis Regulation and the Lugano Convention. This position was consistent with the case law of the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation, which accepted the validity of asymmetric clauses provided that they met the requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty. (Cass., 1ère civ, 25 mars 2015, n°13-27.264 ; Cass., 1ère civ., 7 octobre 2015, n° 14-16.898 ; Cass, 1ère civ, 28 septembre 2022, n°21-13.686).

At the same time, the Commercial Chamber took a different approach, upholding such clauses solely on the basis of the principle of party autonomy enshrined in the Brussels I bis Regulation. (Cass. Com. 11 mai 2017, n°15-18.758).

Faced with this divergence, the Cour de cassation referred a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, to determine whether the validity of such clauses should be assessed under national law or solely under the criteria of Article 25(1) of the Regulation. The CJEU answered unambiguously: validity falls exclusively within the scope of that provision, to the exclusion of substantive grounds of invalidity arising under national law.

The CJEU validates asymmetric jurisdiction clauses… subject to conditions

In its ruling, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized the principle of the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, basing its reasoning essentially on the principle of party autonomy.

First, the CJEU resolved the question referred by the French Cour de cassation in favor of an autonomous, unified European standard of validity.

In this regard, it held that “complaints alleging that this agreement is unfair or unbalanced must be examined solely in light of the autonomous criteria set out in Article 25(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, and not in light of the criteria relating to substantive grounds of invalidity defined by the national law of the Member States.”

In so ruling, the CJEU took the opportunity to recall that the concept of “substantive invalidity,” referred to in Article 25(1), refers to the general grounds for invalidating a contract (defect in consent, capacity, etc.), which fall under the law of the Member State whose court is designated.

The CJEU then had to rule more specifically on asymmetric jurisdiction clauses — that is, clauses that designate a particular court for both parties while allowing one of them the option of bringing proceedings before another court. It is essential to note that the question concerned a particularly open-ended wording, in which the optional court was not identified but instead referred to by a general formula (here, “any other competent court”).

The CJEU upheld the principle of such clauses, including when drafted in general terms. However, this validation is subject to conditions: the clause must satisfy three conditions in order to meet the requirements of sufficient foreseeability and precision within the meaning of Article 25 of the Regulation:

• designate the courts of one or more Member States of the European Union or parties to the Lugano II Convention (the European Union and Switzerland, Norway and Iceland);
• identify objective elements sufficiently precise to enable the court seized to determine whether it has jurisdiction;
• comply with the provisions of the Brussels I bis Regulation which, by way of exception, lay down rules protecting insured parties, consumers and employees, and which do not derogate from any exclusive jurisdiction provided for in that Regulation.

By implication, the Court accepted that the imbalance inherent in asymmetry is not, in itself, contrary to EU law.

The CJEU left it to national courts to interpret such clauses in order to determine whether they actually make it possible to identify a court with jurisdiction. The CJEU thus clarified the legal regime applicable to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, but left certain grey areas, which the French Cour de cassation has, in part, since undertaken to resolve.

The Cour de cassation adopts a flexible interpretation of these conditions of validity

In four rulings handed down on 17 September 2025, the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation ruled on the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. The Court upheld these clauses, adopting a favorable approach in principle based on purposive reasoning, going even further than the CJEU’s position, in a more liberal direction. The Court was faced with two types of clauses.

• In two cases (notamment Lastre), the clause designated, on the one hand, the jurisdiction of a precisely identified court applicable to both parties, and, on the other hand, allowed one of them to bring proceedings before «any other competent court».
• In the other two cases, the option reserved to one of the parties allowed it to bring proceedings before a court identified on the basis of objective criteria (the court of the place where the guarantor held assets, or that of the place of the branch).

As regards the first set of clauses, the Court, exercising the interpretive power recognized by the CJEU, held — based on a search for effet utile (practical effect) — that since the contractual relationship had no connecting link with a state that was not a Member State of the European Union and not a party to the Lugano Convention, the clause allowing proceedings to be brought before “any other competent court” should be interpreted as implicitly referring to the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The Cour de cassation concluded that, in that case, such a clause satisfies the requirement of precision laid down by Article 25.

The combined use of party autonomy and effet utile, coupled with a (very) reasonable interpretation of the factual situation, creates a genuine rule in favor of validity (favor validitatis) for asymmetric clauses.

In the second set of cases, the clauses targeted courts identifiable on the basis of objective factors, but which could, in theory, lead to courts located outside the Brussels I bis/Lugano area. The Cour de cassation, following in the footsteps of the CJEU, nevertheless upheld these clauses.

It noted, in particular (for example, in AXA), that the clause allowing proceedings to be brought before the court of the place where the guarantor held assets enabled the court to identify the competent jurisdiction on the basis of objective factors previously defined by the parties, without having to resort to the jurisdiction rules of third countries. According to the Court, this clause therefore satisfies the requirement of precision under Article 25.

Once again, the Cour de cassation sought to favor such clauses, even though the CJEU had not expressly ruled on this type of provision, having instead addressed general or imprecise clauses. The message is clear: asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are viewed favorably by the French courts, provided they refer to identifiable jurisdiction rules.

Asymmetric validity for clauses outside the EEA: one final effort…

An ambiguity remains concerning clauses stipulating an option in favor of “any competent court,” where the contractual relationship is located, in whole or in part, outside the Brussels I bis/Lugano area. The CJEU appears to harbor a degree of reservation in this respect. The Cour de cassation has not yet expressly ruled on this specific situation, even though the rulings of 17 September 2025 lay some groundwork.

A few lines of thought, and one piece of practical advice, may be offered.

• Why maintain reservations toward asymmetric clauses providing for an option in favor of “any competent court” outside the European area, when non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are themselves permitted under the Brussels I bis Regulation? Likewise, why maintain such reservations when contractual relationships involve foreign states that are otherwise bound by multilateral (Conv. La Haye du 30 06 05)  or bilateral international conventions (France has concluded more than 40) laying down jurisdiction rules just as clear as those set out in the European instruments?
• In practice, the drafter of such a clause would be well advised to explicitly designate the court it reserves as an option. There is indeed little point in reserving the right to bring proceedings before one or more courts in any of the world’s 193 states, when, statistically, only two or three jurisdictions are of any real interest in the event of a dispute.

In other words: grasp too much and you lose your grip — including when it comes to international dispute resolution clauses.

Scope of application, the concept of allocation to an economic activity, the treatment of certain real estate assets, and the risks associated with restructurings undertaken to fall outside the scope of the measure: behind a stated aim of being targeted, the regime raises numerous questions of interpretation and legal certainty.

Julien highlights a central issue: as things stand, the measure leaves several major uncertainties unresolved, which call for a careful reading of the text and its practical effects.

Read the full article on the Journal Spécial des Sociétés website – JSS: https://jss.fr/post/taxe-sur-les-holdings-un-cadre-juridique-encore-fragile

Designed as a practical tool for business leaders, this guide offers concrete guidance on the key stages of a capital opening: project preparation, valuation, governance, shareholders’ agreement, relations with the investor, and issues relating to control of the company.

Through this contribution, Altaïr Avocats takes part in a collective initiative bringing together players from the regional ecosystem, with a shared goal: providing business leaders with content that is useful, accessible, and directly actionable.

Thank you to Sud Place Financière for its trust, as well as to all the contributors involved in this publication.

Check out: https://lnkd.in/gTFg7